UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/358
5 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1084 (1996) of 27 November 1996, in which the Council requested me to continue my efforts to break the impasse blocking the implementation of the settlement plan. The Council also requested me to propose alternative steps, in the framework of the plan, should there be no meaningful progress towards removing the obstacles to its implementation and to submit to the Council, by 9 May 1997, a comprehensive report on all significant developments, including their humanitarian aspects.

2. The present report covers developments since my interim report of 27 February 1997 (S/1997/166), including the initial contacts undertaken by my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and other aspects relevant to the settlement plan.

II. MISSION OF THE PERSONAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

3. In an effort to encourage the parties, the Government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), to overcome the persisting stalemate, I appointed Mr. James A. Baker III, former Secretary of State of the United States of America, as my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. I requested Mr. Baker to assess the implementability of the plan, to examine ways of improving the chances of resuming its implementation in the near future and, if there were none, to advise me on other possible ways of moving the peace process forward.

4. In preparation for Mr. Baker's visit to the region, my Acting Special Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen, held consultations in Rabat and Tindouf, to discuss with the parties various matters relevant to my Personal Envoy's mission.

5. Following consultations with me and preliminary discussions with the representatives of the two parties and the neighbouring countries, Algeria and

Mauritania, in New York on 2 April, my Personal Envoy undertook an exploratory mission to the region from 23 to 28 April. On arrival in Rabat on 23 April, Mr. Baker and his delegation were joined by Mr. Jensen. Mr. Chester A. Crocker, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, also participated in the mission.

6. In Rabat, Mr. Baker was received by H.M. King Hassan II, and met with Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, Prince Moulay Rachid, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mr. Abdellatif Filali, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Driss Basri, Advisors to the King, Mr. Driss Slaoui and Mr. André Azoulay, the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, Mr. Ahmed Snoussi, and other senior government officials.

7. In Algiers, where he arrived on 25 April, Mr. Baker was received by the President of Algeria, H.E. Mr. Liamine Zeroual, and met with the Prime Minister, Mr. Ahmed Ouyahia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ahmed Attaf, the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations, Mr. Abdallah Baali, and other senior government officials.

8. In Nouakchott, on 26 April, my Personal Envoy was received by the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, H.E. Mr. Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya, and met with Prime Minister Sheikh El-Avia Ould Mohamed Khouna, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sidi Ould Khliva, and the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations, Mr. Ahmed Ould Sid' Ahmed.

9. In the Tindouf area, on 27 April, my Personal Envoy met with the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, as well as with Mr. Bachir Mustafa Sayed, who was until recently the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the newly appointed Coordinator, Mr. M'hamed Khaddad, the Frente POLISARIO Representative in New York, Mr. Ahmed Bukhari, the Frente POLISARIO Representative in Washington, Mr. Moulud Said, and Saharan tribal leaders (sheikhs).

10. In Tindouf, my Personal Envoy also met with observers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to MINURSO. In this connection, I wish to express my appreciation to OAU for its continuing support of my efforts.

11. Following these initial contacts, it is Mr. Baker's intention to hold another round of consultations for more in-depth discussions relevant to the assessment that I have asked him to undertake.

12. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Government of Spain, whose decision to make an aircraft available to my Personal Envoy greatly facilitated his visit to the region.

III. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE ASPECTS

Military component

13. During the reporting period, the military component of MINURSO, led by Major-General Jorge Barroso de Moura (Portugal), continued to monitor and verify the ceasefire through daily ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance. Its strength currently stands at 228 (see annex to the present report).

14. Cooperation with both the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Frente POLISARIO has been generally good. No violations of the ceasefire were reported during the period under review. However, there were instances where RMA failed to comply with certain technical requirements of the ceasefire rules, particularly with regard to the timely submission of requests for carrying out activities that are monitored by MINURSO. As RMA and the Frente POLISARIO continued to conduct live-fire exercises in almost all regions, the Force Commander requested both sides to refrain from undertaking such exercises with heavy weapons during May and June 1997, in order to avoid any potential rise in tension towards the end of the Mission's current mandate.

15. Once my Personal Envoy has completed his assessment of the situation, I shall review the strength of the military component of MINURSO and make recommendations on any further reductions that may be carried out without affecting the operational capability of the Mission to monitor and verify the ceasefire.

Civilian police component

16. In my interim report of 27 February (S/1997/166), I indicated that, in order to reduce costs further, it was my intention not to replace the personnel of the civilian police component of MINURSO at the end of their assignments, or earlier if agreed by their Governments. Consequently, the Acting Police Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan H. Kleven (Norway), and three officers will be leaving at the end of their tour of duty on 31 May. The remaining five officers are expected to leave as soon as the necessary consultations with the Governments concerned have been completed.

IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN

Release of prisoners of war

17. During my Personal Envoy's consultations in the Tindouf area, the Frente POLISARIO presented him with a list of 85 prisoners of war whom it proposed to release. This list was communicated to the Government of Morocco and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Repatriation of refugees

18. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is continuing its preparatory work for the repatriation of refugees, with the assistance of its Field Office in Tindouf. An international UNHCR staff member

has also been appointed to Tindouf effective 15 February 1997. The priorities of this office, during the first six months, are to monitor the delivery of assistance and the welfare of refugees.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

19. Currently, an amount of $2,658,500 gross has been made available for the maintenance of the Mission for the month of June 1997 under the terms of General Assembly resolution 51/2 of 17 October 1996, subject to the extension of the mandate. My proposed budget for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 (A/51/763/Add.1) has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at the second part of its resumed fifty-first session. It is estimated that the monthly cost of maintaining MINURSO at its current strength will amount to $2,425,650 gross beginning 1 July 1997. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission, as recommended in paragraph 22 below, the cost of maintaining MINURSO would be within the monthly rate indicated above.

20. As at 30 April 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 November 1996 amounted to $40.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 April 1997 was $1,644.5 million.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21. As I informed the Security Council in my letter to its President dated 17 March 1997 (S/1997/236), I have decided to intensify the examination of all the questions blocking the implementation of the settlement plan. Accordingly, I appointed Mr. James A. Baker III as my Personal Envoy to help me assess the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council. I wish to thank him for having accepted this task.

22. During his exploratory consultations with the parties and the two neighbouring countries, my Personal Envoy stressed that he had come to make a fresh assessment of the situation and to discuss with all concerned ways of breaking the current stalemate. Mr. Baker will return to the region in June, after which he will report to me on his findings and recommendations. I hope to be in a position thereafter to submit to the Security Council a comprehensive report on all aspects of the Western Sahara issue. In the meantime, I recommend that the mandate of MINURSO be extended for four months, until 30 September 1997.

23. Six years have elapsed since the establishment of MINURSO with the aim of holding a referendum of self-determination in Western Sahara. The international community has made it clear that it cannot continue to support the extension of MINURSO's mandate indefinitely and that the parties must demonstrate in a clear and tangible manner the political will necessary to take decisions that would bring about a fair and lasting solution to the problem of Western Sahara. I urge the parties to cooperate fully with my Personal Envoy, so as to achieve this goal and strengthen the prospects for peace and stability in the region.

Annex

COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA

	Strength as at 2 May 1997		
	Military observers	Support units	Total
Argentina	1		1
Austria	4		4
Bangladesh	6		6
China	16		16
Egypt	19		19
El Salvador	2		2
France	25		25
Ghana	6	7[a]	13
Greece	1		1
Guinea	3		3
Honduras	12		12
Ireland	8		8
Italy	5		5
Kenya	8		8
Malaysia	13		13
Nigeria	3		3
Pakistan	5		5
Poland	3		3
Portugal	5		5
Republic of Korea	0	20[b]	20
Russian Federation	24		24
Tunisia	1		1
Uruguay	13		13
United States of America	15		15
Venezuela	3	—	3
Total	201	27	228

[a] Force orderly room.

[b] Medical personnel.

Map No. 3691 Rev. 12 UNITED NATIONS
May 1997

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/359
7 May 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

1. At 2035 hours on 6 March 1997, in the Shatt al-Arab channel inside Iraqi territorial waters, a United States helicopter circled the Iraqi tug Hayyit a number of times at very low altitude.

2. At 1900 hours on 15 April 1997 a grey-coloured United States Navy helicopter flew over the area near buoy 13 inside Iraqi territorial waters.

3. At 1300 hours on 17 April 1997, near buoy 15 inside Iraqi territorial waters, a grey-coloured helicopter armed with two missiles coming from the United States frigate Halyburton on station to the south of Mina' al-Bakr and Mina' al-Amiq flew over an Iraqi patrol boat at very low altitude.

4. At 1850 hours on 21 April 1997 a United States Navy helicopter flew over the area near buoy 13 inside Iraqi territorial waters at low altitude before heading towards the Kuwaiti shore.

I request your intervention with the United States of America with a view to halting and ensuring that there is no recurrence of these unwarranted acts of provocation, which are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international law inasmuch as they are in flagrant violation of the sovereignty of a State Member of the United Nations. In accordance with the principle of State responsibility, I also affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for the damage caused to it by these violations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-12023 (E) 080597 080597 090597

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/360
7 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 MAY 1997 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As you are aware, following a request from the delegation of Qatar supported by a large majority of Member States to convene an emergency special session pursuant to General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled "Uniting for peace", to consider "Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory" (A/ES-10/1, annex), and upon the concurrence of a majority of Members, the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly was convened on Thursday, 24 April 1997. It would be recalled that the request was made following discussions in the Security Council which had been unable to take action because of the lack of unanimity of its permanent members.

Fifty-nine Member States and two observers participated in the debate on the "Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory". On Friday, 25 April 1997, by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to 3 against, with 11 abstentions, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/ES-10/2.

In that connection, I have the honour to draw your attention, in particular, to paragraphs 9 and 13, in which, the General Assembly:

> "9. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor the situation and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution, within two months of its adoption, in particular on the cessation of the construction of the new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim and of all other illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
>
> "...
>
> "13. Decides to adjourn the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States."

I would like to request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) RAZALI Ismail

97-12047 (E) 070597

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/361
8 May 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 APRIL 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL[1]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 22 April 1997 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, containing the comments of the Iraqi side on the semi-annual report of the Special Commission submitted to the Security Council on 11 April 1997 (S/1997/301).

I should be grateful if you would have the letter of the Deputy Prime Minister circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Notes

[1] Received by the Secretariat on 8 May 1997.

Annex

Letter dated 22 April 1997 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

After careful study of the semi-annual report dated 11 April 1997 submitted by the Special Commission, I consider it necessary to clarify some of the items it dealt with, in order to avoid the inappropriate impressions which the report may give of those items, their implications and the overall picture of the current state of implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

I should like to point out that we do not normally comment on the reports of the Special Commission and that our comments on this report are intended to give a clearer and more precise picture of the reality of the situation, and not to provoke a dispute with the Special Commission.

The Special Commission's report has been issued at a point marking six years since its work in Iraq began, which gives an indication as to the state and true nature of the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), particularly paragraph 22 thereof, and as to Iraq's expectations under the provisions of the resolution.

The established facts, after six years of work by the Special Commission, are as follows:

1. There are no proscribed weapons, nor components for or means to manufacture them, in Iraq. No proscribed activities are going on. The references made by the Special Commission to the possible existence of some remaining problems, although slight, are merely unconfirmed suspicions and suppositions.

2. The monitoring system has been in continuous operation since August 1994 and covers the whole country, and there are currently 333 observation posts. The report notes the number of inspections carried out by the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under this system.

3. The export/import monitoring mechanism has been operational since May 1996.

4. There has been genuine and intensive cooperation with the Special Commission through:

(a) the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996; and

(b) the generous provision of human and material resources, as required, to facilitate the work of the Special Commission and IAEA.

These are, very briefly, the basic facts concerning the status of implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Unfortunately, however, the report fails to present them clearly or in such a way as to do justice to Iraq's achievements. The basic facts have been subsumed

in a mass of detail and a tendency to selectivity in choosing and insisting on certain details.

We have further noted that when the report refers to problems of a practical nature, it does not deal with them in the appropriate context, thereby giving an inexact impression of the situation. The Special Commission issues pronouncements on Iraq's intentions based on mere suppositions or expectations.

We shall now proceed to deal systematically with some of the points raised in the report:

1. A fundamental concern is that the report, with no respect for the precision expected of the Special Commission, confuses past events with those occurring subsequent to the agreement on the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996. This programme praised the excellent relationship between Iraq and the Special Commission and the success of joint action in solving the problems which had arisen during the operation, making genuine progress in eliminating missiles and chemical weapons and reaching agreement on a method of work to close the biological weapons file. Such a confusion is not objective and will give Council members an erroneous picture of the situation. There is a clear contradiction in the report between the picture of earlier events conveyed by the report and the conclusions reached by the same report, which refer to progress, a positive and constructive relationship and the resolution of difficulties.

2. In paragraph 7, the report states that, since spring 1996, the Commission has carried out a series of unprecedented inspections aimed at detecting the alleged concealment mechanism and getting access to proscribed weapons and matériel, production tools and related documents. It stresses that these inspections have not revealed any proscribed items. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that, regardless of the Iraqi Government's numerous affirmations, the most recent of which was made at the discussions held with the Chairman of the Special Commission from 3 to 5 April 1997, that there are no concealed proscribed weapons, components or capabilities and that events which took place in the past were merely isolated and exceptional actions taken by Hussein Kamal and his group, not State-directed policy, the Special Commission continues to circulate claims of alleged concealment.

3. There is a clear tendency in the report to exaggerate and inflate the role of the Special Commission and play down the role of Iraq and its cooperation in making progress. It is axiomatic that the Special Commission cannot carry out its mandate pursuant to section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) without the active and wide-ranging cooperation of the Iraqi side. It should be noted that hundreds of Iraqi officials of every rank have been working to meet the requirements of the Special Commission over the past six years. Further to these requirements, we have made exceptionally generous resources and facilities available in the very difficult circumstances resulting from the continuing embargo imposed on Iraq since August 1990.

4. Unfortunately, the report also neglects to mention the fundamental and effective role played by Iraq in providing the Special Commission with information and documents which have helped it to put together a clear picture

of earlier programmes. The report conveys the impression that all these developments were achieved through the efforts of the Commission's inspector, whereas the established facts show that, particularly after 1992, the majority of documents and information were obtained by the Special Commission as a result of Iraqi initiatives and cooperation with the Commission and joint action, not as a result of the inspection operation.

5. The statement made in paragraph 55 of the "Conclusions" section of the report ("requires ... Iraq's leadership...") is preposterous. It has been affirmed in all the meetings held with the Chairman of the Special Commission since August 1995, the most recent being from 3 to 5 April 1997, that Iraq does not possess and is not concealing any proscribed weapons or the components for any proscribed weapons. I have requested the Chairman of the Special Commission to confirm this assertion on behalf of the Iraqi Government and to inform the Security Council accordingly. This reference in the report is absurd and should not appear.

6. Concerning deliberate concealment, it is perfectly clear from closely reading the report itself that the degree of obscurity and the number of areas that are unclear to the Special Commission in the weapons files have been steadily decreasing since work began in accordance with the programme of action of 22 June 1996. This much is clear from the conclusion of the report, particularly in regard to missile and chemical activities, thereby indicating that the approach of joint action and professionalism is the correct one for arriving at the facts and consequently closing the files in accordance with the requirements of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), as opposed to the approach of making accusations and assumptions which are unsubstantiated by concrete evidence. In this connection, we are struck by paragraph 55 (in the "Conclusions" section), which refers unspecifically to "remaining problems". Its portrayal of these problems, however, as being such that they cannot be solved through a technical process only and as requiring a major political solution is incorrect and contradicts the conclusion drawn in paragraph 46 that not much is unknown about Iraq's proscribed capabilities. In our estimation, this conclusion is based on the assumptions contained in paragraph 47 and on political allegations hostile to Iraq.

7. In paragraph 53, we find that the Special Commission has, without legal basis, begun to interpret the requirements of paragraph 22 in a manner contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which are strictly connected with Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations, having indicated that it would not be able to report under that paragraph in view of the fact that third States have failed to provide the Commission with information for verification purposes.

8. We categorically refute the content of paragraph 26, to the effect that the last six months have seen a pattern of efforts to restrict monitoring activities. In this connection, our position is strengthened and that allegation contradicted by the tremendous number of monitoring activities in the chemical field (referred to in para. 20 of the appendix), amounting to 550 inspections, and in the field of missiles (para. 34 of the appendix), amounting to 250 inspections during this period. In addition, 86 sites are under regular monitoring by the Commission's resident biological teams at the Baghdad

Monitoring and Verification Centre (para. 9). Neither should we forget to mention the intensive activities of the export/import monitoring group, which are continuing normally (paras. 34, 35 and 36).

9. We cannot but express our disquiet over the accusation in paragraph 27 that the National Monitoring Directorate has manipulated the monitoring declarations presented by facilities, so that they are misleading. We note that the accusation is made in a general fashion and avoids any mention of the number of instances and their proportion in relation to the number of monitoring operations conducted during the previous period. The fact is that this reference concerns one or two instances which occurred as a result of a typographical error or a lack of understanding on the part of certain workers at the sites included in the monitoring of the procedures of the National Monitoring Directorate. We would also point out that it is impossible in a short time to make a full inventory of the dual-use equipment in the country, particularly if taking into account those pieces of such equipment which are spent or inoperational.

10. Paragraph 31 of the report discusses the Chilean helicopter flight operations and the problems which arose. While we acknowledge that these problems did actually occur, they did so on no more than three occasions in the course of over 1,000 flight hours of the said Chilean crew, bearing in mind that the Special Commission has been carrying out aerial reconnaissance using helicopters since 1992 and that only a few problems have been recorded in five years. Iraq is at pains to ensure the safety and security of the helicopter flights of the Special Commission. At the regular meeting, these problems were discussed constructively and both parties arrived at solutions to them, even though we also had certain comments to make. The Chairman of the Special Commission expressed sympathy with those comments and the difficulties were resolved during the meeting by means of proposals made by the Iraqi side. We are therefore surprised that these incidents are discussed in a provocative manner in the report and treated as if they were intended to restrict the activities of the Special Commission.

11. Paragraph 27 of the report refers to the discovery of several hundred pieces of dual-use equipment. In explanation, we can state that this equipment exists in various hospitals and universities and was not declared by the persons concerned in those establishments, as they did not think that they were required to do so. This is because they did not have an accurate grasp of the monitoring plan and of the equipment which it included, particularly since, during the most recent period, the Special Commission issued an amended copy of the technical appendices to the monitoring plan annexed to Security Council resolution 715 (1991). It should be pointed out that this equipment was not found in any factory or production facility.

12. We note with concern the linkage made between the absence of some documentation connected with the later phase of the chemical weapons programme (para. 17 of the appendix) and the effectiveness of the monitoring regime. This linkage is not objective and can have no practical justification. Paragraph 18 of the appendix confirms that an unfavourable analysis of intent has already been made, the Special Commission having concluded that the retention of documentation concerning the production of toxic chemical agents and commercial

contracts for the chemical weapons programme is for the purpose of resuming proscribed production. The Iraqi side has surrendered to the Special Commission the documentation concealed by Hussein Kamil prior to August 1995 and has no hidden documentation in its possession. Such reasoning also neglects the facts relating to proscribed production, in the sense that the capabilities, raw materials and equipment must be available in order for production to take place that a rigorous and comprehensive monitoring regime is also in place. Concerning the overall question of documentation, it has been asserted on several occasions to the Chairman of the Special Commission that the supply and surrender of documentation to the Special Commission serves Iraq's objective of having the files closed. Iraq cannot therefore desist from furnishing the Commission with the available documentation, as to do so would not be in its interest.

13. Paragraph 16 of the report refers to other dual-use equipment. This equipment is known to the Special Commission and was not concealed from it; indeed, the types and numbers of such equipment have been specified at its request. Similarly, the number and type of all pieces of analytical equipment have been declared, this being general equipment used in laboratories, factories and universities that is subject to monitoring by the Special Commission.

14. We draw attention to the significance of paragraph 46, which states that the accumulated effect of the work accomplished over the past six years is such that not much is unknown about Iraq's retained proscribed weapons capabilities. It is striking, therefore, that it is this unknown element that is overstated, in paragraph 47, on the basis of a scenario of unrealistic theories and assumptions that could not be further from the truth. Iraq's decision to relinquish weapons of mass destruction and ensure that it does not possess them in the future is clear cut.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/362
9 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 MAY 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the attached letter, dated 9 May 1997, which I have received from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations (see annex). Attached to the letter is the third bi-weekly report on the multinational protection force for Albania requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997.

I should appreciate your bringing the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Letter dated 9 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit the third report on the multinational protection force for Albania (see appendix). The report is submitted pursuant to the requirement set out in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997, in which the Council requested the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General, to the Council. The second such report was conveyed to you on 25 April (S/1997/335, annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and the third report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

Appendix

Third report to the Security Council on the operation of the multinational protection force in Albania

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 March 1997, the Security Council adopted resolution 1101 (1997), in paragraph 2 of which it welcomed the offer made by certain Member States to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.

2. In paragraph 9 of the resolution the Security Council requested the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General to the Council. The first report was provided on 9 April 1997 (S/1997/296, annex) specifying, inter alia, the parameters and modalities of the operation on the basis of consultations between Member States participating in the force and the Government of Albania; the second report was provided on 25 April 1997 (S/1997/335, annex). The third report refers to events between 23 April and 7 May 1997.

II. MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE

Political guidance

3. The Steering Committee, consisting of the political directors of the troop-contributing countries and the Commander of the operation, continues to follow the overall situation on the ground and the full compliance of the activities of the force with the Security Council mandate. It meets on a weekly basis. Up to now it has had meetings on 4, 9, 14, 23 and 30 April and 6 May.

4. Slovenia, having formally decided to contribute to the force with a medical unit (27 men), joined the Steering Committee as of its meeting of 30 April.

5. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Belgium joined the Committee as observers.

6. The United Nations is represented by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs while representatives of both the Presidency and Commission of the European Union are present. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) are represented by their respective presidents. A representative of Albania is regularly invited to attend the meetings.

Cooperation with Albanian authorities

7. The Albanian Ambassador to Rome attended the meeting of the Steering Committee on 10 April. He confirmed the full support of the Government of Albania for the multinational protection force operation and expressed appreciation for the humanitarian activities in the security framework provided by the force. This position was reiterated to the Minister of Defence of Greece who visited Albania on 28 April.

8. The Steering Committee intends to maintain constant contacts with the Albanian authorities, in particular the central commission established to serve as the interdepartmental point of coordination and contact in Tirana. The commission is headed by the Secretary of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pavli Zeri, whom the Steering Committee has invited to attend its next meeting.

Cooperation with international organizations

9. In compliance with the mandate described in resolution 1101 (1997), the humanitarian assistance programme for Albania has been largely implemented in a secure environment to which the force contributes. The force has already provided direct support to such international organizations as the World Food Programme (WFP) and EU/ECHO. The force ensures security on the roads used by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for food deliveries in the north of Albania. Additional activities in the same direction are planned between the force and WFP. Several non-governmental organizations have made inquiries about possible support from the force. Special procedures have been established by the Steering Committee for this purpose.

10. OSCE has established a presence in Tirana and Ambassador Grubmayr, Resident Deputy of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Albania, has taken up his functions.

11. The European Union/PHARE programme for Albania is about to be activated while UNICEF and WFP are providing emergency assistance to Albania. ICRC activities are continuing safely, as are those of some non-governmental organizations.

12. Following the fact-finding mission that visited Albania from 23 to 25 April, WEU defined a mandate for a European advisory, training and support programme for the Albanian police. OSCE and the European Union are actively considering the possibility of supporting this programme, the latter in the framework of a joint action on which initial discussion by the European Union took place at the Ministerial Council in Luxembourg on 29 April.

13. On 5 May, WHO and UNICEF launched polio vaccination campaigns throughout the country.

Force deployment

14. The deployment of the force and the achievement of its planned tasks is progressing well within the scheduled time. The control by sea and air of the

key entry points in the country is now fully achieved. The force deployment has substantially improved the security conditions for aid deliveries. The force is strengthening its military organization and progressively expanding the framework of security into the country, gaining control of the main roads and communications in the application of its mandate. As of 7 May, the deployment of the force reached a level of 6,345 units, 98 per cent of the total envisaged.

15. The current deployment is as follows: Austria, 116; Denmark, 11; France, 923; Greece, 803; Italy, 2,973; Romania, 399; Spain, 341; and Turkey, 779. The arrival of the Romanian contingent took place on 4 May. The Danish contingent completed deployment on 7 May.

Summary of operations

16. The force is consolidating its presence in the planned sites of deployment. Security has been provided for several humanitarian convoys. Surveillance, patrolling and security have been assured on many itineraries. Air, naval and telecommunications activities have proceeded according to scheduled plans.

17. Civilian-military cooperation is developing, in particular through the specific branch of the force created for this purpose. Local representatives of the main international organizations active in Albania (including UNICEF, WFP, EU/ECHO and ICRC) took part in a security and logistic support briefing on 30 April. Reconnaissance by the force was carried out at the site of Qafe Shtama/Burrel following the explosion of a munitions depot that caused the death of 22 Albanian civilians.

18. Assistance and protection for official visits has been provided by the force. Special procedures for this purpose are being defined.

III. CONCLUSIONS

19. Force deployment is almost complete and has had a positive effect on the overall security situation in Albania. Commercial and industrial activities are resuming as well as maritime connections. Schools have reopened. Sports and social activities are returning to normal. Curfew has been reduced. However, isolated clashes are still recorded. One clash involving the force took place in Vlore on 4 May. Two rival bands opened fire near an Italian camp. The force fired warning shots. No one was injured and there was no substantial damage. Organized crime and racketeering are still continuing in certain areas where police control remains insufficient.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/362*
16 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 MAY 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the attached letter, dated 9 May 1997, which I have received from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations (see annex). Attached to the letter is the third bi-weekly report on the multinational protection force for Albania requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997.

I should appreciate your bringing the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

Letter dated 9 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit the third report on the multinational protection force for Albania (see appendix). The report is submitted pursuant to the requirement set out in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997, in which the Council requested the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General, to the Council. The second such report was conveyed to you on 25 April (S/1997/335, annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and the third report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

Appendix

Third report to the Security Council on the operation of the multinational protection force in Albania

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 March 1997, the Security Council adopted resolution 1101 (1997), in paragraph 2 of which it welcomed the offer made by certain Member States to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.

2. In paragraph 9 of the resolution the Security Council requested the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General to the Council. The first report was provided on 9 April 1997 (S/1997/296, annex) specifying, inter alia, the parameters and modalities of the operation on the basis of consultations between Member States participating in the force and the Government of Albania; the second report was provided on 25 April 1997 (S/1997/335, annex). The third report refers to events between 23 April and 7 May 1997.

II. MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE

Political guidance

3. The Steering Committee, consisting of the political directors of the troop-contributing countries and the Commander of the operation, continues to follow the overall situation on the ground and the full compliance of the activities of the force with the Security Council mandate. It meets on a weekly basis. Up to now it has had meetings on 4, 9, 14, 23 and 30 April and 6 May.

4. Slovenia, having formally decided to contribute to the force with a medical unit (27 men), joined the Steering Committee as of its meeting of 30 April.

5. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Belgium joined the Committee as observers.

6. The United Nations is represented by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs while representatives of both the Presidency and Commission of the European Union are present. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) are represented by their respective presidents. A representative of Albania is regularly invited to attend the meetings.

Cooperation with Albanian authorities

7. The Albanian Ambassador to Rome attended the meeting of the Steering Committee on 30 April. He confirmed the full support of the Government of Albania for the multinational protection force operation and expressed appreciation for the humanitarian activities in the security framework provided by the force. This position was reiterated to the Minister of Defence of Greece who visited Albania on 28 April.

8. The Steering Committee intends to maintain constant contacts with the Albanian authorities, in particular the central commission established to serve as the interdepartmental point of coordination and contact in Tirana. The commission is headed by the Secretary of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pavli Zeri, whom the Steering Committee has invited to attend its next meeting.

Cooperation with international organizations

9. In compliance with the mandate described in resolution 1101 (1997), the humanitarian assistance programme for Albania has been largely implemented in a secure environment to which the force contributes. The force has already provided direct support to such international organizations as the World Food Programme (WFP) and EU/ECHO. The force ensures security on the roads used by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for food deliveries in the north of Albania. Additional activities in the same direction are planned between the force and WFP. Several non-governmental organizations have made inquiries about possible support from the force. Special procedures have been established by the Steering Committee for this purpose.

10. OSCE has established a presence in Tirana and Ambassador Grubmayr, Resident Deputy of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Albania, has taken up his functions.

11. The European Union/PHARE programme for Albania is about to be activated while UNICEF and WFP are providing emergency assistance to Albania. ICRC activities are continuing safely, as are those of some non-governmental organizations.

12. Following the fact-finding mission that visited Albania from 23 to 25 April, WEU defined a mandate for a European advisory, training and support programme for the Albanian police. OSCE and the European Union are actively considering the possibility of supporting this programme, the latter in the framework of a joint action on which initial discussion by the European Union took place at the Ministerial Council in Luxembourg on 29 April.

13. On 5 May, WHO and UNICEF launched polio vaccination campaigns throughout the country.

Force deployment

14. The deployment of the force and the achievement of its planned tasks is progressing well within the scheduled time. The control by sea and air of the

key entry points in the country is now fully achieved. The force deployment has substantially improved the security conditions for aid deliveries. The force is strengthening its military organization and progressively expanding the framework of security into the country, gaining control of the main roads and communications in the application of its mandate. As of 7 May, the deployment of the force reached a level of 6,345 units, 98 per cent of the total envisaged.

15. The current deployment is as follows: Austria, 116; Denmark, 11; France, 923; Greece, 803; Italy, 2,973; Romania, 399; Spain, 341; and Turkey, 779. The arrival of the Romanian contingent took place on 4 May. The Danish contingent completed deployment on 7 May.

Summary of operations

16. The force is consolidating its presence in the planned sites of deployment. A security framework has been provided for several humanitarian convoys. Surveillance, patrolling and security have been assured on many itineraries. Air, naval and telecommunications activities have proceeded according to scheduled plans.

17. Civilian-military cooperation is developing, in particular through the specific branch of the force created for this purpose. Local representatives of the main international organizations active in Albania (including UNICEF, WFP, EU/ECHO and ICRC) took part in a security and logistic support briefing on 30 April. Reconnaissance by the force was carried out at the site of Qafe Shtama/Burrel following the explosion of a munitions depot that caused the death of 22 Albanian civilians.

18. Assistance and protection for official visits has been provided by the force. Special procedures for this purpose are being defined.

III. CONCLUSIONS

19. Force deployment is almost complete and has had a positive effect on the overall security situation in Albania. Commercial and industrial activities are resuming as well as maritime connections. Schools have reopened. Sports and social activities are on their way to normal. Curfew has been reduced. However, isolated clashes are still recorded. One clash involving the force took place in Vlore on 4 May. Two rival bands opened fire near an Italian camp. The force fired warning shots. No one was injured and there was no substantial damage. Organized crime and racketeering are still continuing in certain areas where police control remains insufficient.

UNITED
NATIONS

A S

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/894
S/1997/363
9 May 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 81
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 9 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach the Libreville Declaration on the situation in Zaire (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have it circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 81, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Denis DANGUE RÉWAKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-12329 (E) 120597 120597

/...

ANNEX

Libreville Declaration

At the request of His Excellency Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire, and at the invitation of His Excellency El Hadj Omar Bongo, President of the Gabonese Republic, an extraordinary summit meeting of the Central African Heads of State was held on 8 May 1997 in Libreville.

The following dignitaries took part in this summit meeting:

- Mr. Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire;
- El Hadj Omar Bongo, President of the Gabonese Republic;
- Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea;
- Mr. Idriss Deby, President of the Republic of Chad;
- Mr. Pascal Lissouba, President of the Republic of the Congo;
- Mr. Ange-Félix Patassé, President of the Central African Republic;
- Mr. Ferdinand Léopold Oyono, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representing President Paul Biya of the Republic of Cameroon, current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The Central African Heads of State considered developments in the crisis in Zaire in the light of the conclusions of the meeting held on 4 May 1997 in Pointe Noire between President Mobutu and Mr. Laurent Désiré Kabila, under the auspices of Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of the Republic of South Africa, and Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, the joint United Nations/Organization of African Unity Special Representative for the Great Lakes region.

President Mobutu presented the Central African Heads of State with an exhaustive historical account of the crisis in Zaire.

Following a thorough exchange of views, the Heads of State reaffirm their firm attachment to a negotiated political solution to the conflict and reject all recourse to violence as a means of settling disputes, and they recall the principles of OAU, in particular resolution 16 of July 1964, adopted in Cairo, on the territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of the borders inherited from the colonial period.

Consequently, the Heads of State reaffirm their adherence to the peace plan of the United Nations and OAU as set forth in United Nations Security Council resolution 1097 (1997) of 18 February 1997.

The Heads of State urgently call on the two parties to respect the commitments freely entered into under the terms of the final communiqué of the

extraordinary summit meeting of OAU held in Lomé on 27 March 1997 and the Pretoria communiqué of 8 April 1997.

The Central African Heads of State have taken note of President Mobutu Sese Seko's important statement that, for health reasons, he would not stand for re-election, thus opening up new prospects for a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. They take this opportunity to reaffirm their attachment to the democratic process of institution-building.

The Heads of State urgently call on the Zairian political forces, under the direction of the High Council of the Republic-Transitional Parliament, to proceed to the election of their President so as to allow for the normal functioning of institutions and to promote an orderly and democratic transition in accordance with the Constitutional Act of Transition.

In the light of the Zairian crisis, and in order to strengthen security, peace and stability in Central Africa, the Heads of State have decided to establish a structure for consensus-building and crisis management in Central Africa, the organization of which shall be decided by the Heads of State.

The Heads of State have also decided to undertake missions of mediation and peace to the Heads of State of the countries concerned with the conflict in Zaire.

Lastly, the Heads of State make a strong appeal to the parties to the dispute to cease hostilities immediately in order to create the conditions for a negotiated political settlement of the crisis in Zaire.

Done at Libreville on 8 May 1997.

(Signed) MOBUTU SESE SEKO

(Signed) Omar BONGO

(Signed) OBIANG NGUEMA MBASOGO

(Signed) Idriss DEBY

(Signed) Pascal LISSOUBA

(Signed) Ange Félix PATASSE

(Signed) Ferdinand Léopold OYONO

UNITED
NATIONS

A S

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/895
S/1997/364
12 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 9 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention new provocative actions to be carried out by the illegal regime in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by Turkey.

In information made public, the illegal secessionist entity set up in the occupied areas of Cyprus has announced its intention to put up for sale properties, namely, two hotels, "The Dome" in Kyrenia and "The Salamis Bay" in Famagusta, which were illegally usurped from their rightful owners following the Turkish invasion and occupation of a large part of Cyprus in 1974. According to this information, the aforementioned actions are to be taken as first steps in a so-called "privatization programme".

Such properties belong to their legal owners who were forcibly uprooted from their ancestral homes and properties by the Turkish invading and occupying forces.

With regard to the ownership of property, I should also like to refer to the binding decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Loizidou versus Turkey, which concluded in its judgement of 18 December 1996 that the applicant remained legal owner of her property in the occupied area and that Turkey was in violation of the European Human Rights Convention by preventing her from returning to and enjoying her property in Kyrenia.

These actions by Turkey, which are aimed at consolidating the fait accompli created through the use of military force, are in violation of the principles and norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

Moreover, these Turkish actions take place at a most sensitive phase of the Cyprus problem, at the very time when you are exerting determined efforts to bring about a just and lasting solution.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest these illegal Turkish actions and request the immediate intervention of the United Nations to prevent them from taking place.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicos AGATHOCLEOUS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/365
12 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1082 (1996) of 27 November 1996. By that resolution the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) until 31 May 1997 "with a reduction of its military component by 300 all ranks by 30 April with a view to concluding the mandate as and when circumstances permit". In the same resolution the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 15 April 1997 with his recommendations on a subsequent international presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council subsequently decided, in its resolution 1105 (1997) of 9 April 1997, to suspend the reduction of the military component until the end of the current mandate on 31 May and requested me to submit to the Council by 15 May the report referred to in resolution 1082 (1996).

II. COMPOSITION, STRENGTH AND MANDATE OF UNPREDEP

2. Since my predecessor's last report to the Security Council on 19 November 1996 (S/1996/961), the composition, strength and mandate of UNPREDEP have remained unchanged. The mission continues to be headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Henryk Sokalski (Poland). The Force's military component consists of two mechanized infantry battalions: a Nordic composite battalion and a United States Army task force, each with a strength of 500 personnel. The two battalions are supported by a 50-man engineering platoon from Indonesia. UNPREDEP also has 35 military observers and 26 civilian police monitors drawn from 27 countries (see annex). The military component of the mission is headed by the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Bo Wranker (Sweden).

3. The present composition of the Force represents a blend of professional skills which allow for the highest levels of readiness and proficiency. It also provides for a limited reserve capacity to meet a wide range of contingencies in adverse terrain and climatic conditions. The Indonesian engineering platoon

provides indispensable support to the two battalions through the construction of roads and repair of the main supply routes to the observation posts.

4. In addition to the community and border patrols carried out by the civilian police and the military observers, UNPREDEP military personnel conducted more than 190 patrols a week during the reporting period. On average, UNPREDEP observes approximately 90 patrols per week by the armed forces of Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the host country. However, during the month of March 1997, the number of those patrols increased to more than 160 per week. Furthermore, UNPREDEP reports that military units of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and those of the host country now actively patrol their territory up to the old administrative border of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is the view of UNPREDEP that those patrols are closely linked to the process of demarcating the border between the two countries. The new pattern of patrolling has increased the frequency of encounters with UNPREDEP patrols operating in those areas and has been a source of concern to the Force Commander. Following consultations, both sides have reaffirmed their intention to respect the understanding on the United Nations patrol line, which was negotiated to facilitate UNPREDEP patrolling based on visible and manageable key terrain features rather than on the old administrative border.

5. Under Security Council resolution 1082 (1996), the strength of the UNPREDEP military component was to have been reduced to 750 personnel by 30 April 1997. The reduced component would have continued to comprise a Nordic composite battalion and a United States Army task force, each with a strength of 350 personnel. The number of observation posts would have been reduced from 21 to 12. Formed infantry units would have remained on the northern border, while the western border would have been monitored by military observers. Support to the two battalions would have continued to be provided by the Indonesian engineering platoon.

6. As the members of the Security Council are aware, the escalation of the crisis in neighbouring Albania earlier this year prompted the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to write to me on 7 March 1997 (see S/1997/205, annex) to request an urgent suspension of the proposed reduction of the strength of the military component. As I informed the Council on 3 April 1997 (see S/1997/276), my Special Representative and the Force Commander had themselves conveyed to me their concern about the timing of the reduction of the Force and, with my agreement, had temporarily suspended the reduction of the military component. The Council, having considered my letter and my related recommendation, decided in its resolution 1105 (1997) of 9 April 1997 to suspend the reduction until the end of the current mandate on 31 May. The Council also welcomed the redeployment of UNPREDEP in the light of the situation in Albania and encouraged me to continue further redeployment, taking into consideration the situation in the region, consistent with the mandate of UNPREDEP. Appropriate measures have been taken on the ground to comply.

7. The establishment of UNPREDEP as an independent mission in 1996 has considerably upgraded its capacity for political action under the terms of paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994. The civilian component of the mission has utilized the good offices mandate vested

in my Special Representative to bring together the various communities in an effort to promote mutual understanding, help strengthen respect for human rights and ease political and inter-ethnic tensions within the country. The civilian component of the mission has also been active in initiating contacts among various segments of the population in order to address a number of underlying socio-economic problems which, if neglected or overlooked, have the potential to exacerbate political tensions. This activity has been of special importance given the precarious social and economic situation in the country. Humanitarian assistance to the local population, especially on the part of the national battalions, has also been an important element of the actions of UNPREDEP.

III. ACTIVITIES OF OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES

8. United Nations organizations, agencies and programmes are making a modest but important contribution to the country as regards institutional capacity-building and the strengthening of governmental infrastructure and mechanisms. At the initiative of UNPREDEP, several agencies have also provided assistance in areas crucial to the country's development. These include the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

International Monetary Fund

9. As previously reported (see S/1996/961, para. 17), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has successfully completed two financial arrangements with the Government: a systemic transformation facility and a standby arrangement, totalling disbursements of US$ 75 million. IMF and the Government have concluded negotiations for an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility agreement which would provide an additional $80 million over a three-year period at concessional interest rates. IMF has also supported numerous technical assistance programmes, including two long-term projects, one with the Department of Banking Supervision of the National Bank and the other a modernization project with the customs administration.

United Nations Children's Fund

10. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) manages a country programme in support of children in the Republic, which has an annual budget of approximately $1.6 million and an unfunded element of $1 million. Its activities focus on the health, education and social welfare sectors and on how they address the transition process. UNICEF is one of the main external partners in the social sector, coordinating its activities with those of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNESCO, the World Bank, UNDCP and a range of national and international non-governmental organizations as well as bilateral donors. More recently, the office has been actively planning cross-border assistance to Albania.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

11. Two international consultants continue to assist in the introduction of the United Nations-designed Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) computer system in the cargo division of the local customs administration. The project is aimed at facilitating trade, improving customs efficiency and providing accurate statistical information on imports and exports. It will be extended to all 21 export offices by May 1997 and will be installed at import locations before the end of the year.

United Nations Development Programme

12. The Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) granted recipient status to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in mid-1993. That led to the implementation of a technical cooperation programme that began in early 1995. The first operational project, jointly supported by UNDP and bilateral donors, was aimed at improving cross-border facilities and traffic infrastructure on the Albanian and Bulgarian borders. The current programme provides support for the preparation of a cross-sectoral national development strategy, as well as assistance in building national capacities for investment promotion, standardization, metrology and quality control. A country cooperation framework outlining the strategy and focus for the Programme's assistance in the coming three years is currently in preparation.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights

13. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights facilitate technical cooperation and serve as a contact point and a source of information for government activities relating to human rights.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

14. In addition to its programme of basic assistance to Bosnian refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to be involved in the repatriation of Bosnian refugees to their home country. In collaboration with other agencies, and as an early warning measure, UNHCR has been monitoring developments on the border with Albania.

World Bank

15. Three projects of the World Bank are currently in operation: a $16.9 million health sector transition project, an $11 million private sector development project and a $7.9 million private farmer support project.

16. The World Bank has negotiated a structural adjustment loan and credit of $45 million to support further liberalization of the trade regime, to help reduce price interventions and to assist in the privatization of the socially owned enterprises in agriculture, as well as industrial and commercial enterprises. Together with the European Commission, the World Bank co-chaired the first joint Group of 24/Consultative Group Donors Conference in Brussels to support the country's external financing gap in 1997. Credits and donations of $65 million have been pledged to the economic stabilization and structural reform programme.

World Health Organization

17. The priority areas for cooperation under the 1996-1997 cooperative agreement between WHO and the Ministry of Health include health policy development, health-care reform, prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, environmental health and mother and child health care.

18. A pioneer training project on mental health aspects of psychosocial trauma has also been launched. A new Mental Health Commission has been established, which will propose comprehensive legislation and reforms on mental health. Two other WHO programmes focus on health promotion for schoolchildren and on a national drug information centre.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

19. Since my predecessor last reported to the Security Council, there have been few positive developments in the region. In most of the countries neighbouring the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, public unrest and tension have been evident. Social unrest has occurred in Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. State institutions have collapsed and social structures have disintegrated in Albania. The situation in Kosovo remains tense and has been a source of continued concern to the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which remains apprehensive that developments in that region might directly affect the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, difficulties have been encountered in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement.

20. In its resolution 1082 (1996), the Security Council reiterated its call on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to implement in full their Agreement of 8 April 1996 (see S/1996/291, annex), particularly regarding the demarcation of their mutual border. While the two Governments have made significant and welcome progress in developing their mutual relations in many areas, no final agreement has been reached on the border demarcation. Both sides have, however, shown a willingness to resolve this issue and have indicated that an agreement could be reached in the very near future.

21. While relations with Greece have further improved, the dispute on the name-related issue remains. My Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, continues to pursue actively the search for a mutually acceptable settlement of that issue.

22. Domestically, developments have been uneven. On the one hand, the latest local elections, in which all political parties participated, have strengthened the pluralistic composition of the political scene and the exercise of grass-roots democracy. During the reporting period, the Parliament has established the high office of the Ombudsman and adopted a law on instruction in the languages of the ethnic communities at the pedagogical faculties. It has also passed a declaration on promoting inter-ethnic relations. The rector of 'Tetovo University' has been released before the expiration of his prison term. Mounting social discontent in the wake of the collapse of a large private

savings bank and allegations that some public figures were involved in the scheme responsible for the collapse has been dampened by the Government's assurances that the matter would be investigated thoroughly. All these developments demonstrate that the democratic process is making headway in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

23. At the same time, however, a number of worrisome developments have been observed during the reporting period. The passage of the law on instruction in the languages of the ethnic communities sparked daily protests, followed by a hunger strike, by ethnic Macedonian students. The slogans displayed by the demonstrators and the opposition to any instruction in languages other than Macedonian by some segments of the academic community reflected a degree of intolerance and xenophobia. The law was also criticized as insufficient by the ethnic Albanian political parties, which continued to call for a comprehensive law on higher education that would also legalize "Tetovo University". Simultaneously, radical demands have resumed in some ethnic Albanian communities to establish ethnically based federalism in the Republic. International concern about such developments was expressed in the statement issued by the Presidency of the European Union on 11 March 1997 (A/52/95) and in the conclusions of the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, issued on 13 March 1997. Those developments have tested the country's fragile communal mosaic and have underscored the fact that, unless they are tackled in earnest by all concerned, inter-ethnic relations may ultimately prove to be a significant destabilizing factor in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

24. In a letter addressed to me on 1 April 1997 (S/1997/267), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated that it was his country's view that the current situation in the region, combined with previously unresolved problems, had underscored the need to extend the existing mandate of UNPREDEP for an additional six months. He further stated that the events in Albania had contributed to the continued vulnerable security situation in the region and could have a spillover effect on neighbouring countries. In the light of the increasing number of cases of various armed gangs trespassing into the territory of the Republic, the Minister expressed the view that the presence of an objective foreign entity such as UNPREDEP would be of great importance in verifying or clarifying problems that could arise from such incursions. Additional arguments put forward for extending the mandate of UNPREDEP included, inter alia, the fragile and complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political unrest in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the elections in that country, the situation in Kosovo, the continued lack of defensive capacity of the army of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the pending demarcation of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

25. In meetings with United Nations officials, all levels of the host country's Government have stressed that the monitoring and reporting mandates of UNPREDEP have provided an essential tool for an objective assessment by the international community of the situation in the region. It is the Government's position that the presence of UNPREDEP on the borders of the Republic not only has prevented a radicalization of the crisis in neighbouring areas, notably in Kosovo, but also has effectively stopped active hostilities from spilling over into the country.

UNPREDEP confirms that the recent uncontrolled looting of installations on the Albanian side of the border with the Republic did not spread to communities or border posts in the immediate border area. UNPREDEP also confirms that the refocusing of its activities along the western border and its reinforced and highly visible community patrols in minority villages along the border during the height of the Albanian crisis had a calming effect on the population in those areas. It is the mission's view that its rapid and flexible response increased the confidence of the local population in the ability of the Republic to withstand the potential threat to its stability.

V. OBSERVATIONS

26. As pointed out in my letter of 3 April 1997 to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/276), recent developments in Albania have demonstrated that stability in the Balkan region remains extremely fragile. Uncertainty still prevails in that country, in part because of the lack of a constructive dialogue among the parties. There have been doubts about the possibility of holding free and fair elections in June. In the absence of a legitimate, elected and representative Government and of progress in re-establishing collapsed public institutions, efforts to revive the shattered economy of Albania will be severely undermined. So too will the relative stability established by the multinational protection force. In addition, the lack of a perceptible and early change in the situation in Albania could lead to another explosion of internal violence, which may have a negative impact on neighbouring countries. In this regard, the large number of weapons circulating in the region, some of which have already been interdicted in the border areas by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, pose a risk to stability in the region that cannot be neglected. Yet another potentially destabilizing factor in the coming months will be the outcome of the elections scheduled to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in September of this year.

27. In the light of the strong views conveyed to me by the Government of the host country for a continued UNPREDEP presence, the continuation of the conditions that led to the suspension of the drawdown of the military component and the challenges to be faced in the region in the near future, I am of the view that it would be imprudent to recommend that the UNPREDEP mission be terminated. I believe it would be equally imprudent to recommend any immediate changes in the mandate or size of the Force at this time. I therefore recommend that the mandate of UNPREDEP be renewed for an additional six months until 30 November 1997. I further recommend that the present strength of the Force be maintained for a period of four months, up to 30 September 1997, with a view to starting as of 1 October 1997, taking into account the conditions prevailing at that time, a two-month phased reduction of the military component to the 750 troop level foreseen by the Council in resolution 1082 (1996).

28. I have in the meantime instructed my Special Representative and the Force Commander to evaluate the effectiveness and composition of each component of the UNPREDEP mission and to provide me in a timely manner with their recommendations on measures that will ensure that the mission implements all of its mandates in a cost-effective and coherent fashion, including the possibility of improving the structure of the military elements of the Force. I have also requested a

reassessment of the present deployment of those elements in order to ensure a higher state of operational efficiency and increased flexibility to respond to changing circumstances on the ground, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1105 (1997). I have furthermore instructed UNPREDEP to examine the feasibility of reorganizing the mission in order to enhance the role of the civilian police, military observer and civilian elements in the fulfilment of the mandate.

29. In conclusion, I should like to thank my Special Representative, Mr. Sokalski, as well as the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Wranker, and all the military and civilian personnel under their command, for their dedication and perseverance in carrying out the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

Composition and strength of the military and civilian police elements of UNPREDEP as at 9 May 1997

Nationality	Military			Civilian police
	Operational	Headquarters	Military observers	
Argentina	-	-	1	-
Bangladesh	-	-	2	-
Belgium	-	-	1	-
Brazil	-	-	2	-
Canada	-	-	1	-
Czech Republic	-	-	1	-
Denmark	39	4	2	-
Egypt	-	-	1	-
Finland	351	14	1	5
Ghana	-	-	1	-
Indonesia	50	1	2	-
Ireland	-	-	2	-
Jordan	-	-	1	2
Kenya	-	-	2	-
Nepal	-	-	1	-
New Zealand	-	-	1	-
Nigeria	-	-	1	1
Norway	41	7	2	-
Pakistan	-	-	2	-
Poland	-	-	2	-
Portugal	-	-	1	-
Russian Federation	-	-	2	1
Sweden	33	9	1	-
Switzerland	-	-	1	6
Turkey	-	-	-	4
Ukraine	-	-	1	4
United States of America	494	13	-	-
Total	1 008	48	35	23[a]

[a] Figures may vary owing to rotations.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/365/Add.1
15 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE

Addendum

1. In my report on the financing of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) (A/51/508/Add.3), which is currently before the General Assembly, the cost of maintaining the Force at its present strength for a 12-month period is estimated at $49.5 million gross (equivalent to $4,125,000 per month). Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP, as recommended in paragraph 27 of my report, the cost of maintaining the Force will be within the resources to be provided by the General Assembly.

2. As at 30 April 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNPREDEP special account for the 12-month period ending 30 June 1997 amounted to $7.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 April 1997 was $1,644.5 million.

97-12830 (E) 150597

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/366
13 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 MAY 1997 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council express their appreciation for your letter dated 1 May 1997 (A/51/886-S/1997/347) concerning the informal consultative meeting on Afghanistan, held in New York on 16 April 1997. They welcome your initiative to convene the meeting of the concerned countries to reassess the situation in Afghanistan following recent political and military developments, to discuss how best to promote a negotiated settlement of the conflict and reinforce the United Nations peacemaking efforts.

The members of the Security Council remain gravely concerned about the danger of the continued armed conflict for the region and the plight of the Afghan people. They stress the need for the Afghan parties to cease immediately all armed hostilities, renounce the use of force, put aside their differences and engage in a political dialogue aimed at achieving peace and national reconciliation.

The members of the Security Council reaffirm their support for the continuing efforts of the United Nations, in particular those of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, to facilitate national reconciliation in Afghanistan on the basis of General Assembly resolution 51/195 of 17 December 1996 and Security Council resolution 1076 (1996) of 22 October 1996. While recognizing the need for all concerned countries to be involved in the search for peace, they stress that such initiatives should be coordinated with the United Nations which plays the central role in promoting agreement on a ceasefire and negotiations between the Afghan parties.

The members of the Security Council take note of the concrete proposals by the participants at the above-mentioned consultative meeting aimed at assisting the peaceful resolution of the conflict. They believe that it represented a useful international framework which could meet more frequently.

The members of the Security Council will continue to follow closely the developments in Afghanistan.

(Signed) PARK Soo Gil
President of the Security Council

97-12617 (E) 130597